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Abstract 
 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic method enabling two 
parties to establish a private encryption key. The range of communication of ground-
based QKD is limited to an order of 100km, due to in-fibre attenuations and 
atmospheric losses, and the development of quantum repeaters remains 
technologically challenging. While trusted-node links make communication over 
large distances possible, satellite-QKD is required for communication over global 
distances. By using satellites equipped with high-quality optical links, satellite-QKD 
can achieve ultra-long-distance quantum communication in the 1000-km range. The 
significant potential of satellite-QKD for the creation of global quantum networks 
thus makes it a particularly interesting field of research. In this analysis, we begin 
with an overview of the technical parameters of performing satellite-QKD, including 
infrastructure and protocols. We continue with a high-level summary of 
advancements in satellite-QKD by analysing past, present and proposed satellite-
QKD missions and initiatives around the world. We conclude by discussing the 
technical challenges currently faced in satellite-QKD, which can be tackled through 
future research in this area. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a scheme enabling two parties to derive a 
private and symmetric encryption key. QKD has the potential to significantly advance 
information security and encryption processes for mankind. The development of 
quantum computers represents an increasing threat to conventional public key 
distribution, driving research into new forms of “quantum-safe” encryption 
techniques [1-2]. QKD is a promising alternative to public key cryptography, 
providing unconditional security that cannot be obtained by classical cryptographic 
means as it is founded on the principles of quantum mechanics [3]. QKD is 
fundamentally based on the fact that quantum information is coded into the degrees of 
freedom (e.g. polarization states) of individual photons, which prevents successful 
attempts to measure and clone a quantum bit (in this case a photon). This is due to the 
fact that it is impossible to clone a quantum state without irreversibly altering its state 
(also known as the no-cloning theorem) [4], causing it to lose its information. Hence, 
attempts by third parties to eavesdrop will necessarily lead to detectable errors, 
making QKD highly secure and resistant to interference.  
 
The general concept behind satellite-QKD is as follows. A trusted satellite 
conducts QKD with ground stations to establish independent secret keys with each 
station. To create a common key to be used by a pair of ground stations (for example 
stations A and B), the satellite broadcasts the bit-wise parity of each individual key, 
KA ⊕ KB. Since KA and KB are independent strings known only to each station, their 
bit-wise parity does not reveal any useful information to eavesdroppers. Each station 
can obtain the other’s key: For station A to obtain station B’s key, it would determine 
the bit-wise parity of its own key with the broadcast (KA ⊕ (KA ⊕ KB) = KB). 
Similarly, station B can obtain station A’s key through the operation KB ⊕ (KA ⊕ 
KB) = KA. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Illustration of the most common satellite-QKD scheme: the flying trusted-node. In step (a), the satellite establishes a 
shared secret key KA with station A by running a QKD protocol, which requires both classical and quantum communication. 
This step is repeated in (b) to establish a shared secret key KB, this time with station B located further away. At the end of these 
steps, the satellite hold both keys, while each station knows only their own. Finally, in step (c), the satellite publicly announces 
the parity of both keys KA ⊕ KB. This allows station B to determine key KA, which can then be used to encrypt private 
communication to A and vice versa [101]. 
QKD has already been successfully used to distribute secret keys between two 
parties using fibre networks and free-space ground links [5-7]. Some attempts have 
even been successful in existing telecommunication infrastructure [8]. However, the 
main limitation of ground-based QKD is that the maximum communication distance 
is limited to an order of ~100km [5-7] due to various reasons including atmospheric 
losses, noise of available single photon detectors, and in-fibre attenuations [9]. Free-
space, Earth-bound links are also restricted by the Earth’s curvature and atmospheric 
turbulence [10]. Research has been conducted to develop quantum repeaters (devices 
that extend the range of quantum communication between sender and receiver) to 
overcome this problem [11]. However, the development of quantum repeaters remains 
technologically challenging, as it requires successful entanglement creation over the 
intermediate distances, as well as storage of the entanglement until entanglement has 
been established in the adjacent link [12].  
 
There is a need to increase the range of quantum communication for a 
successful global quantum network to be created. In light of this, a possible solution 
to this problem is satellite-QKD. Due to low absorption and negligible nonbirefractive 
character of the atmosphere, optical free space links are superior to fibre links and 
free-space ground links in achieving ultra-long-distance quantum communication. 
Hence, optical free space links are currently the most promising channel for large-
scale quantum communication by use of satellites and ground stations [13-15]. The 
usage of a satellite terminal in space makes it possible to develop quantum 
communication networks on a global scale. Significant experimental efforts have been 
devoted to investigating the feasibility of satellite-based quantum communications. 
With the development of new technologies, researchers have extended the 
communication distance of QKD, entanglement distribution, and quantum 
teleportation between fixed locations to 1000-km scale [16], which makes satellite-
QKD a very promising solution to the technological challenges mentioned earlier 
[17]. While there are several improvements to be made, satellite-QKD brings us 
closer to a global quantum network that enables the sharing of strong encryption keys 
between any two points on Earth. 
 
This report provides an overview of the research and developments that have 
contributed to the realization of satellite-QKD. We begin by discussing the various 
technical parameters of performing satellite-based QKD regarding protocols and 
infrastructure. We continue with a timeline of the key milestones in the development 
of satellite-QKD, followed by a summary of globally completed and proposed 
quantum satellite missions, categorized by specific advancements thus far in satellite-
QKD. We conclude by discussing the technical challenges faced and future directions 
to address these challenges. 
 
  
II. Technical Parameters of Satellite-QKD 
 
 There are several technical parameters that characterise satellite 
communication links in satellite-QKD, which are expounded below. 
 
a. Orbit Altitude 
 
There are three main classes of satellite orbital altitudes: Low Earth Orbit 
(LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and Geostationary Orbit (GEO) (sometimes 
referred to as High Earth Orbit) [18]. LEO is situated from 180 to 2000 km in altitude, 
MEO is situated from 2,000 to 35,786 km in altitude, and GEO has an altitude of 
precisely 35,786 km. For past and current satellite-QKD applications, LEO is the 
most common option (see Section III.), however future projects might seek altitudes 
in the MEO or GEO range [19].  
 
Due to the proximity of LEO satellites to the surface, losses due to beam 
diffraction are significantly reduced. However, there is a tradeoff in the high speed of 
the satellite relative to the Earth, compromising pointing accuracy during signal 
transmission and limited time period during which QKD can be performed. The 
converse is true for satellites of higher altitudes: While the satellite is moving more 
slowly than in LEO (in the case of MEO) or at rest relative to the ground (in the case 
of GEO) hence enabling QKD to be conducted continuously, much higher losses are 
experienced when performing QKD at significantly higher altitudes as free space 
losses increase quadratically with distance.  
 
Polar LEO will pass ground stations at the poles with every orbit, whereas 
equatorial LEO do so on the equator [18]. Other orbital inclinations will result in less 
regular ground station passes, and the time of day of flyovers will vary unless the 
orbit is sun-synchronous. Satellites in GEO are located above the equator and closer 
to the horizon approaching the poles, disappearing below the horizon at 81° latitude. 
Hence, the optical link traverses a much larger amount of atmosphere and will suffer 
additional losses. To provide polar regions with near-constant satellite coverage, such 
locations might adopt less conventional orbit choices, such as the Molniya highly 
elliptical orbits [20]. 
  
 
b. Link Configuration 
 
 
Fig. 2: Illustration of different platforms for performing satellite-QKD. Scenarios (1) and (2) depict a downlink and an uplink 
respectively, while in scenario (3) a downlink is simulated by using a retro-reflector on board the satellite. In (4) pairs of 
entangled photons are being transmitted to Earth so that two ground stations can share entangled states. Finally, scenario (5) 
illustrates how inter-satellite links can allow more complex satellite-QKD networks [101]. 
Quantum communication links with a satellite can be classified either as 
uplinks or downlinks. This results in several possible configurations for performing 
QKD with satellites depending on the types of links that are used [21-23].  
 
In a downlink configuration (Scenario 1), the satellite sends signals to the 
ground. Downlinks are usually recommended for operational QKD, and the only type 
of link that has been demonstrated [24]. The primary source of optical losses is beam 
diffraction, which increases with the square of link length, and downlinks always 
have lower losses for any ground-satellite segment. This arises because atmospheric 
properties such as turbulence cause the optical beam to wander, which translates into 
a less accurate ground transmitter compared to a space-based transmitter. 
 
In an uplink configuration (Scenario 2), the ground station sends signals to a 
receiver in space. The main advantage of using an uplink is that it is not necessary to 
locate a quantum light source in space, but only to place a receiver on board the 
satellites [25]. There is a lower photon detection rate on board the satellite and hence 
a significantly smaller amount of data to be stored and exchanged via a classical, 
authenticated but non-secure communication channel. It also makes attacks that target 
receivers significantly more difficult [26]. However, a disadvantage of using uplinks 
is a greater uplink loss of ~10dB due to atmospheric turbulence, which is most 
significant in the first 20 km above the Earth’s surface. These extra losses are 
significant when weighed against the advantages of locating quantum light sources on 
the ground. To overcome this challenge, signal-to-noise ratio filters can be used to 
discard data at high noise levels, reducing the number of photons required for error 
correction and privacy amplification [27].  
 
Retro-reflectors on the satellite (Scenario 3) can also be used to create 
downlinks by modulating signals sent from the ground as they bounce off back to a 
receiver also on the ground [28]. The challenge here is to develop fast modulating 
retro-reflectors, and to develop countermeasures that prevent an eavesdropper from 
sampling the state of the retro-reflector while QKD is being carried out.  
 
In a double downlink configuration (Scenario 4), a source of entangled photon 
pairs located in the satellite transmits photon pairs to the ground, with each photon in 
a pair being transmitted to each ground station in communication [29]. This 
configuration allows the realization of entanglement-based QKD directly between the 
ground stations, without using the satellite as a trusted node.  
 
Inter-satellite links (Scenario 5) allow for communication between two 
satellites in the same orbit (intra-orbit links between satellites in LEO, MEO or GEO) 
or in different orbits (inter-orbit link) [30]. A combination of inter-layer and intra-
layer links, called constellations of satellites (see Section IV.) can enable more 
complex satellite-QKD architectures by allowing each system to collaborate with 
other systems. This increases the quality of satellite services, decreases the 
unavailability of services and integrates different services in a single system [31]. 
 
 
 
 
 
c. DV-QKD or CV-QKD 
 
QKD protocols can be divided into two categories: discrete-variable quantum 
key distribution (DV-QKD) or continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-
QKD). In DV-QKD, information is encoded onto discrete degrees of freedom of 
optical signals. In CV-QKD, information is encoded in the quadratures of randomly 
selected coherent states and measured using either homodyne or heterodyne detection 
[32-33]. While most satellite QKD projects have chosen to implement discrete-
variable schemes, significant research has been dedicated to both approaches leading 
to increasing key generation rates and improved compatibility with current 
communications infrastructure. However, both approaches are limited in that physical 
communication channels introduce transmission losses that increase exponentially 
with distance, greatly limiting the secure key rates that can be achieved over long 
ranges. There is also a need to reduce the reliance on classical communication 
between the two parties when establishing the final key [33-34]. 
 
d. Photon Sources  
 
For DV-QKD, there are two main photon sources: weak coherent pulses 
(WCP) or polarization-entangled photon-pairs. 
 
Short attenuated pulses from laser diodes provide controlled weak coherent 
pulses needed to provide photon states for DV-QKD to enhance the security of these 
systems. However, each pulse has a finite probability of containing more than a single 
photon [35-36]. Decoy-states have hence been created to reduce the likelihood of 
photon-number splitting attacks and thus detect eavesdropping. One party randomly 
chooses between two intensities of coherent state signals, which is revealed publicly 
to the other party after quantum communication, improving the tolerance to losses 
compared to the typical prepare-and-measure BB84 protocol that does not employ 
decoy-states. This increases the transmission distance and rate of key generation [37]. 
To address the need for active polarization manipulation, the usage of four laser 
diodes in a single transmitter [35] exploits the high degree of polarization of the 
diodes, allowing each diode to be identified with a unique polarization state. Using a 
single laser diode coupled to four waveguides, the side-channel accessible by 
potential eavesdroppers was closed. Each waveguide was capable of a fixed amount 
of polarization rotation and the signals were then recombined to result in a single-
mode output with four possible polarization states. 
 
Entanglement-based QKD schemes require the generation of photons using 
polarization entangled photon-pair sources. These sources are based on bulk-crystal, 
collinear, spontaneous parametric downconversion (SPDC), either periodically-poled 
potassium titanyl phospate (PPKTP) or single-domain crystals such as beta barium 
oxide (BBO). SPDC is a non-linear optical process where a photon spontaneously 
splits into two other photons of lower energies [38]. In particular, Type II spontaneous 
parametric down-conversion produces photon pairs that emerge on two cones where 
the vertically polarized photon is on the upper cone and the horizontally polarized 
photon is on the lower cone [39]. A free-space link is then used to distribute one 
photon from the entangled pair to Alice, while the other is transmitted to Bob [39]. 
 
 
d. QKD Protocols  
 
Several protocols exist to implement QKD between two parties, which can be 
subdivided into prepare-and-measure (decoy-state BB84) or entanglement-based 
protocols.  
 
  d(i). Prepare-and-measure protocol: Decoy-state BB84 
 
Alice encodes each classical bit into the polarization state of an individual 
photon before transmitting it to Bob. Alice prepares the photon state by randomly 
choosing between the Z basis (horizontal,  |H>, or vertical, |V>) and X basis (±45º i.e. !√!|H>±|V>), and assigning the states in each basis the values 0 or 1. After choosing 
the basis, Alice, using a true active random number generator, randomly selects one 
of the two states and sends it to Bob, who performs a set of measurements on the 
incoming signals to retrieve the classical data encoded in their states. Bob, using a 
passive random choice generator (e.g. beamsplitters), randomly selects one of the two 
bases and performs a measurement, recording the result as classical bits. This repeats 
for many signals, after which Alice and Bob announce the basis they have chosen for 
each measurement in the measurement set on a classical communication channel. 
They keep the measurements that they obtained using the same basis, and discard the 
measurements that they obtained using different bases. From the preserved signals, a 
random subset is selected to determine the relative error. In the situation of a 
sufficiently low error rate (<11%), error-correcting codes and privacy amplification 
are applied to obtain the final shared secret key [40-43].  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Key exchange in BB84 Protocol implemented with polarization of photons [44] 
 
 
 
 
 
  d(ii). Entanglement-based protocols 
 
A maximally entangled photon pair, usually in the polarization degree of 
freedom, is split such that one photon is transmitted to Alice, while the other is 
transmitted to Bob. The entangled states are perfectly correlated such that if Alice and 
Bob both measure their photons with the same basis, they will always get the same 
answer with 100% probability. Both parties make independent decisions to measure 
the photons in either the Z or X basis. Since eavesdropping inevitably affects the 
entanglement between the two photons in an entangled pair, it detectably reduces the 
degree of violation of Bell’s inequality. 
 
In the BBM92 protocol, parameter estimation, error correction, and privacy 
amplification occur in the same manner as in the BB84 protocol. The main advantage 
of the BBM92 protocol is that it removes the need for Alice to make an active random 
choice when encoding states into the photons, and the measurement devices for Alice 
and Bob are identical [45]. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Complete BBM92 Protocol. Alice and Bob each receive one photon from a stream of entangled photon pairs, they 
randomly pick a basis to measure each photon in, get a measurement result, convert their result to a classical bit, sift their 
results down to only those where they measured in the same basis, use 10% of their measurements to estimate the quantum bit 
error rate (QBER), and generate a final secure key from the rest of their measurement results [46]. 
 
Alternatively, the E91 protocol [47], through the Bell test, will determine 
whether the photon-pair correlations between Alice and Bob violate the Bell 
inequality, confirming the quantum nature of the link and hence its inherent security. 
After receiving each photon from an entangled pair, Alice and Bob measure the 
polarization state of every photon in a randomly chosen basis for each photon and 
note its arrival time. Using a noiseless, authenticated but non-secure public 
communication channel, Alice and Bob will compare the photon arrival times and the 
basis in which each photon was measured, preserving the measurements that were 
conducted using the same basis as the measurement set. By conducting the Bell test 
on this measurement set, should this correspond to the value expected from Bell’s 
inequality, no local realism was introduced to the system and thus there were no 
eavesdroppers [48]. This protocol is resistant to eavesdropping as information is only 
obtained when Alice or Bob perform measurements and key sifting. Eavesdroppers 
also cannot inject their own data, as doing so would necessarily lead to detection 
when the Bell’s inequality value is too low [49]. After both Alice and Bob obtain the 
sifted key, similar error correction and privacy amplification processes will be 
performed to obtain a quantum secured secret key [50].  
 
The E91 measurement scheme is less efficient in its use of photon pairs as the 
Bell inequality test requires more polarization settings to be monitored. However, 
entanglement-based protocols have shown to be more tolerant to loss than prepare-
and-measure protocols due to the intrinsic timing correlation between photon-pairs 
generated in the SPDC process [51]. A typical setup is shown below, using active 
polarization rotators (PR), polarizing beam-splitters (PBS) and avalanche photodiodes 
(APD) [49].  
 
 
Fig. 5: System using entangled photon pairs [102] 
 
f. Optical Links 
 
  f(i). Transmitters & Receivers 
     
Optical links use optical telescopes at the photon source transmitter and at the 
receiver to beam the photons between satellite and ground station. There are two main 
types of telescopes: refractive (or transmissive) and reflective [52]. Refractive 
telescopes use lenses, while reflective telescopes use concave parabolic mirrors. In 
general, reflective mirrors can be made larger and more durable than lenses. Because 
only one side of the mirror is used to focus the light, the other side can be placed 
against a surface for support, enabling a mirror to be much larger relative to a lens. In 
fact, the largest optical telescope in the world at the Keck Observatory in Hawaii is a 
reflecting telescope [53]. The larger the collection device, the more light can be 
directed to the eyepiece, and the brighter the objects appear [54].  
However, while the large size of the primary mirror is advantageous for a 
reflector, this same feature can quickly emphasize the optical aberrations of the 
telescope. To minimize polarization effects at large angles of incidence, a two-mirror 
assembly can be used as a tangentially directed one-wave linear retarder. The primary 
mirror of reflective telescopes acts as a tangentially directed half-wave linear retarder 
and almost completely depolarizes the linearly polarized component of the light. The 
secondary mirror, often placed within the path of the beam to block part of the 
primary mirror, introduces an additional half-wave of linear retardance. Hence, each 
mirror depolarizes alone but together the two-mirror assembly preserves the 
polarization state [55].  
Comparing space and ground-based telescopes, ground-based telescopes are 
much larger and consequently can capture more light. Practically speaking, they are 
less costly, easier to maintain and upgrade, have a much lower risk of being damaged. 
However, atmospheric distortion is a major issue, and Earth’s atmosphere absorbs a 
lot of the infrared and ultraviolet light that passes through it. While space-based 
telescopes are smaller, more expensive and difficult to maintain, they can detect 
frequencies and wavelengths across the entire electromagnetic spectrum [56].  
 
To establish the optical link, a coarse level of mechanical pointing between the 
satellite and ground station is achieved via satellite orbit determination data (including 
radar tracking, GPS and star tracker measurements). Two orthogonal axes of rotation 
are required to track an object across the sky. By mounting the telescope on a two-
axis gimbal, one of three gimbal configurations can be used to achieve coarse level 
pointing for larger spacecraft: altitude over azimuth (Alt-Az), altitude over altitude 
(Alt-Alt), equatorial, or a combination of the three [57]. For nanosatellites, the entire 
satellite is usually reoriented. Optical beacons on the ground and satellite can be used 
for fine-pointing, which is further enhanced by optical beam-steering systems that 
account for atmospheric turbulence.  
 
  f(ii). Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) 
 
Quantum bit error rate (QBER) is the percentage of the sifted raw key that 
does not match between Alice and Bob. QBER is generally a direct measure for the 
secrecy of Alice and Bob’s strings since any eavesdropping strategy would perturb 
the correlations between them [58]. Once QBER exceeds the threshold of 11% QKD 
protocols based on BB84 will be aborted. The links are where the largest losses from 
noise and background photons from stray light occur and thus have the biggest impact 
on the QBER. 
 
Stray light can be minimized through extensive optical blacking measures, 
however even after extensive filtering [59], it is advised that DV-QKD is conducted at 
night until better solutions are found [60-61]. It is possible to achieve this by 
performing DV-QKD at other wavelengths with alternative detectors [62] if suitable 
light sources can be found. On the other hand, CV-QKD can be conducted during the 
day as the optical systems used have a sufficiently small spectral bandwidth that 
allows much of the background to be filtered [63].  
 
  f(iii). Pointing error 
 
To establish an optical link, there are three stages of pointing, each with 
increasing accuracy. In the first stage, to achieve a broad level of mechanical pointing 
between the satellite and the ground, the satellite’s orbit must be determined using 
radar tracking, GPS or star tracker measurements, and this data is exchanged through 
radio frequency links. In the second stage, a more specific level of mechanical 
pointing is achieved using laser beacons both on the ground and the satellite. In the 
third and final stage, the finest level of pointing can be achieved through optical 
beam-steering systems that serve to correct for atmospheric turbulence.  
 
As mentioned in Section IIb., transmitter pointing accuracy is less significant 
in uplink than downlink configurations due to atmospheric turbulence. A 2 µrad rms 
error in the pointing of a 20 cm downlink transmitter would introduce 4 dB of loss 
compared with <1 dB for a 20cm uplink transmitter. Jitter and imperfections in the 
tracking systems should be minimized so their contributions to beam broadening are 
much less than those caused by diffraction and atmospheric turbulence. The receiver 
system need only point to an accuracy within its field of view, e.g., 50 µrad [64].  
 
  f(iv). Wavelength of signal photons 
 
There are 2 major wavelength regimes for a quantum channel, depending on 
the level of expected background photons: 800nm (near the peak quantum efficiency 
of detectors) and 1500nm (telecom wavelength, traditionally used in optical fibre for 
its minimum transmission losses). Many optical link systems are limited by the 
availability of suitable laser sources, specifically in the availability of laser 
wavelengths. For optical links using SPDC sources, the limiting factor is not photon 
generation, but the ability of the single photon detectors to distinguish between the 
photons arriving with small timing separations. Thus to reduce time jitter, the 
avalanche volume of the photodiode and hence detection efficiency is compromised 
[65]. Wavelength conversion efficiency is also another constraint as that of SPDC is 
low; the highest conversion efficiency obtained is 4 × 10−6 [66]. Wavelength 
determination in terms of channel considerations is based on wavelength-dependent 
losses such as atmospheric absorption, diffraction losses and detection efficiency. 
 
  
III. Advances in Satellite-QKD & Summary of completed and proposed missions 
 
 Below is a timeline and summary of completed and proposed satellite-QKD 
missions, organised by general areas of advancement in satellite-QKD. 
 
Timeline 
 
 
Advancement 1: Creating a highly accurate optical link (<5 mrad pointing error) 
  
Mission Aim Satellite Key Findings Status, Date 
Toyoshima 
et al. [67] 
Measuring polarization 
characteristics of 
artificial laser source 
in space through LEO-
to-ground atmospheric 
transmission paths 
OICETS 
570kg 
satellite 
Polarization preserved 
within rms error 1.6°.  
Degree of polarization 
99.4±4.4% through 
space-to-ground 
atmosphere 
Completed, 
2009 
Yin et al. 
[68] 
Space-ground 
transmission of quasi-
single-photon source 
using retroreflectors in 
LEO satellite 
CHAMP 
500kg 
satellite 
Signal-to-noise ratio of 
16:1, sufficient for 
quantum links for 
unconditionally secure 
QKD  
Completed,  
2013 
Vallone et 
al. [69] 
Preservation of 
polarization state from 
LEO-to-ground using 
satellite corner cube 
retroreflectors as 
quantum transmitters 
in orbit 
Jason-2 510kg 
satellite 
Larets 21kg 
satellite 
Starlette 48kg 
satellite 
Stella 48kg 
satellite 
 
Experimental 
realization of quantum 
communication from 
several satellites acting 
as quantum transmitter 
and with the MLRO as 
the receiver. QBER 
6.5% 
Completed, 
2015 
QUBE [70] Testing essential 
systems for quantum 
key generation, optical 
downlink (LEO-to-
ground), and attitude 
control  
 
3U CubeSat Once operational in 
orbit, many new 
conclusions can be 
drawn. Follow-up 
missions will improve 
QKD in multi-satellite 
systems and global 
availability of data 
encryption through 
quantum 
communication. 
Proposal, 
2018 
Advancement 2: Creating sources compatible with launch and space environments  
 
Mission Aim Satellite Key Findings Status, Date 
QUESS [71] 
 
Establish space 
platform with long-
distance satellite and 
ground quantum 
channel 
Micius 
600kg 
satellite 
Entanglement 
distribution of 1203 
km, teleportation up to 
1400 km and BB84 
QKD up to 1200 km. 
QBER ~1%, sifted key 
rate 14kbps 
 
Completed, 
2012 
 
 
Advancement 3: Versatility - Ability to conduct multiple QKD protocols  
 
Mission Aim Satellite Key Findings Status, 
Date 
NanoBob 
[72] 
Photon entanglement 
uplink experiment. Full 
quantum communication 
link >500 km.  
Versatile payload 
compatible with a variety 
of protocols. 
12U CubeSat Entangled photon 
source on ground, 
space segment 
contains “Bob” 
detection system 
only, possible 
implementation in 
12U CubeSat.  
Receiver 
compatible with 
multiple QKD 
protocols and 
other quantum 
physics 
experiments 
Proposal, 
2017 
QEYSSat 
[86] 
Encryption key generation 
through quantum uplinks, 
involving quantum receiver 
onboard satellite that 
measures quantum signals 
sent from photon sources 
on ground.  
Investigate long-distance 
quantum entanglement. 
- - Funded 
Mission 
NanoQEY 
[103] 
Demonstrate long-distance 
QKD between two distant 
ground stations on Earth 
using optical uplink 
Distribute ≥10 kbit of 
secure key between two 
ground stations, with 
satellite as trusted node 
Perform Bell tests for 
entangled photons between 
ground and space 
NEMO 
(Nanosatellite 
for Earth 
Monitoring 
and 
Observation) 
 
(QKD receiver 
designed by Institute 
for Quantum 
Computing, 
University of 
Waterloo) 
- Proposal, 
2014 
 
Advancement 4: Increasing cost-efficiency by reducing size 
 
Mission Aim Satellite Key Findings Status, Date 
Takenaka et 
al. [73] 
First downlink 
microsatellite quantum 
communication 
experiment (50kg-class) 
SOCRATES 
48 kg 
satellite  
 
Feasible.  
<5% QBER and 
99.4 ± 4.4% degree 
of polarization 
with rms error 
 
Completed, 
2017 
Tang et al. 
[74] 
In-orbit photon counting 
experiment measuring 
polarization correlation 
between photon pairs in 
nanosatellite 
Galassia 
1.65kg 2U 
CubeSat 
In-orbit photon 
correlations exhibit 
a contrast of 97 ± 
2%, matching 
ground-based tests 
 
Completed, 
2016 
 
 
Advancement 5: Increasing range 
 
Mission Aim Satellite Key Findings Status, Date 
Günthner et 
al. [75] 
Preservation of 
quantum 
coherence 
properties of 
quantum states in 
GEO  
(propagation over 
38,600km to 
ground) 
 
Alphasat 
I-XL 
6649kg 
satellite 
Quantum limited states 
arrive at the ground station 
despite long propagation 
path  
Upper bound for 
atmospheric and technical 
excess noise of 0.8 ± 2.4 
Completed, 
2017 
Dequal et al. 
[76] 
First single 
photon exchange 
spanning a 
distance 
exceeding 7000 
km (MEO) 
 
LAGEOS-
2 411kg 
satellite 
Feasible. QBER ~3.6%, 
signal-to-noise ratio 1.5, 3 
count/s. Stable photon 
transmission for most of 
passage of MEO satellite. 
Completed, 
2016 
 
 
Advancement 6: Moving Receiver Platforms 
 
Mission Aim Vehicle Key Findings Status, Date 
Nauerth et 
al. [77] 
Ascertain feasibility of 
BB84 QKD between 
ground station and 
airplane moving at 
angular velocity 
similar to LEO 
satellite 
Dornier 228 
utility aircraft 
moving at 
290km/h 
Feasible using 
advanced pointing 
tracking system. 
Compensated for 
mutual rotations of 
sender/receiver. 
QBER 4.8% at 
20km range, sifted 
key rate 145 bit/s, 
angular speed of 4 
mrad/s 
Completed, 
2013 
Bourgoin et 
al. [78] 
First demonstration of 
optical QKD link to 
moving receiver 
platform (truck) 
traveling at equivalent 
angular speed of 
satellite at 600km 
altitude 
Pickup truck 
(receiver) 
driven at 
33km/h 
(angular 
speed of 13 
mrad)  
~650m from 
transmitter 
Feasible. QBER 
6.55%. Sifted key 
rate 40 bit/s, 
angular speed. 
Mean angular 
deviation after 
stabilisation of 
0.005º at 
transmitter 
Completed, 
2015 
Wang et al. 
[79] 
Assessing performance 
under rapid motion, 
altitude change, 
vibration, random 
movement of satellites 
in high-loss regime 
using floating hot-air 
balloon platform  
Hot-air 
balloon with 
angular 
velocity 10.5 
mrad/s, 
average 
angular 
acceleration 
at 1.7 mrad/s2 
Feasible. QBER 
4.04%, sifted key 
rate 48bit/s at 
96km range. Fine 
tracking accuracy 
< 5	µrad 
Completed,  
2013 
Pugh et al. 
[104] 
Investigate utilization 
of intrinsic strong 
correlation between 
pump and output 
photon spatial modes 
in SPDC process to 
mitigate negative 
effects of atmospheric 
beam wander. 
- Demonstrates 
viability of 
QEYSSAt payload. 
Prototypes on 
aircraft and ground 
close to 
requirements for 
satellite uplink. 
 
Completed, 
2016 
 
 
Advancement 7: Polarisation-entangled photon pairs 
 
Mission Aim Satellite Key Findings Status, 
Date 
SpooQySats 
[80] 
Establish space 
worthiness of 
highly-miniaturised, 
polarisation-
entangled, photon 
pair sources 
 
3U CubeSat 
nanosatellites 
Can enable highly secure 
uplinks and downlinks, 
symmetric encryption key 
sharing between optical 
ground stations  
To be 
launched 
from ISS 
in June 
2018 
CQuCom 
[81] 
LEO-to-ground 
transmission of 
entanglement and 
QKD  
 
6U CubeSat High pointing accuracy 
required to minimize link 
loss 
Proposal, 
2017 
 
 
  
Advancement 8: Performing free-space daylight QKD 
 
Mission Aim Satellite Key Findings Status, Date 
Liao et 
al. [82] 
 
Overcome noise from 
sunlight, demonstrate 
free-space daytime 
QKD over 53 km  
- Feasible, compatible with 
ground fibre networks.  
 
Total channel of ∼48 dB 
for 1550 nm free-space 
working wavelength 
 
Completed, 
2017 
Gong et 
al. [83] 
Experimentally 
demonstrate free-space 
satellite-to-ground 
QKD in the presence 
of urban daylight. 
Develop stochastic 
parallel gradient 
descent (SPGD) 
algorithm with 
deformable mirror to 
improve signal-to-
noise ratio.  
 
- Feasible.  
 
8 km QKD experiment 
demonstrated over 7 
hours throughout daytime 
via an intra-city free-
space link. Final secure 
key rate of the QKD is 
98∼419 bps throughout 
the majority of the 
daylight hours. 
Completed, 
2018 
Peloso et 
al. [84] 
Demonstrated the 
continuous running of 
free-space 
entanglement QKD 
system over several 
full day-night cycles in 
variable weather 
conditions 
- Feasible.  
 
Combination of filtering 
techniques used to 
overcome the highly 
variable illumination and 
transmission conditions. 
Continuously generate 
error corrected, privacy 
amplified key at an 
average rate of 385 bps 
 
Completed, 
2008 
Ko, et al. 
[85] 
Analyze QBER and 
key rates for different 
combinations of 
filtering techniques in 
a free-space BB84 
QKD system operating 
over 275m in daylight. 
Optimize conditions of 
filtering techniques to 
obtain the maximum 
secure key rate. 
- QKD system that 
generates nighttime 
secure key rate of 341.17 
kbps could not generate 
secure keys in daylight. 
Noise-filtering 
combination of 1 nm 
spectral BPF, 2.5 ns 
temporal selection, and 
spatial field of view 
(FOV) of 566 µrad used.  
Daytime secure key rate 
of 191.11 kbps can be 
achieved using additional 
filtering techniques with a 
signal window of 1.75 ns 
and an FOV of 283 µrad. 
 
Completed, 
2018 
 
 
Advancement 9: Increasing feasibility of uplink transmission 
 
Mission Aim Satellite Key Findings Status, Date 
QEYSSat 
[86] 
Minimize losses 
in uplink QKD. 
Conduct 
fundamental tests 
of long-distance 
quantum 
entanglement 
 
Microsatellite Involves quantum 
receiver onboard satellite 
that measures quantum 
signals sent up from the 
ground 
Proposal, 
2015 
NanoBob 
[72] 
Photon 
entanglement 
uplink 
experiment. Full 
quantum 
communication 
link >500 km.  
Versatile payload 
compatible with a 
variety of 
protocols. 
 
12U CubeSat Tradeoff between uplink 
losses and versatility. 
Higher uplink loss (~10 
dB) accompanied by 
lower photon detection 
rate on satellite and 
significantly less data to 
be stored and exchanged  
Proposal, 
2018 
Schiedl et 
al. [87] 
Uplink 
entanglement-
based quantum 
optics 
experiments 
(ground-to-space)  
International 
Space Station 
Quantum link can be 
maintained for 20–70s 
within one orbital pass.	
Violation of Bell 
inequality by 3 standard 
deviations of statistical 
significance possible 
within one satellite pass 
(>103 coincidences 
identified). 
 
Proposal, 
2013 
Q3Sat 
[88] 
Demonstrate 
feasibility of 
establishing 
Q.Com uplink 
(ground-to-LEO) 
with 3U CubeSat. 
Leverage latest 
advancements in 
nanosatellite 
body-pointing to 
show that 
CubeSat can 
generate 
quantum-secure 
key 
3U CubeSat Feasible. Q.Com achieved 
over thousands of 
kilometers via single 
trusted node. Relatively 
cheap (<200,000 €). 
Ignoring finite key 
effects, pair of ground 
stations can exchange 13 
x 106 secure bits a year. 
Can be used for Bell tests, 
clock synchronization, 
measuring light pollution, 
earth/atmosphere 
observations at beacon 
wavelengths, and 
studying effect of gravity 
on quantum systems 
 
Feasibility 
Study, 2018 
 
Advancement 10: Others 
 
Mission Aim Satellite Key Findings Status, Date 
CAPSat [89] Demonstrate active 
liquid cooling system. 
Simultaneously reduce 
vibrations and change 
pointing direction. 
Develop single-photon 
annealing technique to 
extend the lifetime of 
radiation-damaged 
APDs  
3U CubeSat Investigate 3 
experiments 
utilizing on-board 
payloads: 
strain-actuated 
deployable panels 
Active thermal 
system for small 
spacecraft 
Single-photon 
avalanche detectors 
 
 
Proposal, 
2016 
SpaceQUEST 
[90] 
Investigate novel 
concepts for space 
communication 
systems.  
 
Propose experiments 
for demonstration of 
fundamental principles 
of quantum physics 
that will benefit from 
environmental 
conditions in space 
(lack of atmospheric 
disturbance/absorption 
allowing very long 
propagation distances) 
 
 
International 
Space 
Station 
Quantum 
communication 
protocols for space 
applications: 
 
1. QKD using 
single and 
entangled photons 
2. Quantum state 
teleportation 
3. Quantum dense 
coding 
4. Quantum 
communication 
complexity 
Proposal, 
2008 
Zeitler et al. 
[91] 
Communicating 
single-photon ququart 
states from LEO-to-
ground between two 
remote parties through 
SuperDense 
Teleportation using 
hyperentangled photon 
pairs 
International 
Space 
Station 
Average fidelity of 
87.01%, ~2x 44% 
classical limit.  
Compared to 
quantum 
teleportation and 
remote state 
preparation, 
requires less 
classical 
information and 
fewer experimental 
resources. 
Exponentially 
larger state space 
volume than the 
lower dimensional 
general states with 
the same number 
of state parameters. 
Proposal, 
2015 
QuCHAP-
IDQuantique 
[92]  
Establish quantum-
safe communication 
networks based on 
high-altitude platforms 
 
 
High-altitude 
platforms 
- Ongoing, 
2015 
QKDsat [93] 
by Arqit 
Launch a constellation 
of small low-cost low 
Earth orbit satellites 
equipped with QKD 
payloads 
- - Proposal, 
2018 
Qubesat [94] 
by CQT and 
RAL 
Use QKD technology 
to test the secure 
distribution of 
cryptographic keys 
between Singapore 
and the UK 
- - Funded 
Mission 
 
  
IV. Challenges and Future Directions of Satellite-QKD 
 
 While the above missions have enabled significant advancement of satellite-
QKD, there are still a number of technical challenges that can be tackled with further 
research and future missions.  
 
 Firstly, research can be conducted to investigate further reductions in satellite 
size. With microsatellites (wet mass from 10 to 100 kg) and nanosatellites (wet mass 
from 1 to 10 kg), further advancements can be made to create a highly accurate 
optical link with <5 mrad pointing error. There is also a need to create sources 
compatible with launch and space environments. The above advancements have been 
achieved with minisatellites (e.g. Micius-type satellites) but not with microsatellites 
or nanosatellites (e.g. Qubesat). This will not only increase the accuracy and precision 
of the satellites, but also improve cost-efficiency when the capabilities of 
microsatellites and nanosatellites are advanced. Reducing satellite size without 
compromising accuracy hence reduces the cost of a single satellite, and increases the 
possibility of launching many satellites, enabling the improvement of the 
spatiotemporal coverage of satellite constellations. 
 
 Next, extensions to higher orbits beyond LEO can be investigated. While 
satellite-QKD missions have been conducted in MEO and GEO ranges (see Section 
III. Advancement 5), LEO is still the common choice for most applications. LEO is 
advantageous in its proximity to the surface, thereby reducing beam diffraction losses. 
Satellites in MEO and GEO are not only at higher altitudes and greater distances from 
the ground, they must be shrouded to prevent the reflection of sunlight to the ground 
station. Using brighter transmitters and improving link performance can reduce signal 
losses, but the performance of MEO and GEO satellites under these conditions will 
still be less than that of LEO. While LEO is advantageous in its reducing beam 
diffraction losses, the high speed of satellites in LEO relative to the Earth 
compromises pointing accuracy during signal transmission and restricts the time 
period during which QKD can be performed to a small window. Satellites in MEO 
and GEO, while suffering higher losses, move much more slowly (MEO) or are at rest 
relative to the ground (GEO), enabling QKD to be conducted continuously. It is 
necessary to move to higher altitudes as entanglement-QKD implemented using a 
double-downlink configuration from MEO/GEO can cover very large distances, 
which greatly facilitates the progression towards building global quantum networks. 
Concurrent efforts to reduce signal losses in satellites at higher orbits will enable us to 
reap the benefits of accurate signal transmission and continuous QKD. 
 
 The superconducting nanowire single photon detector (SNSPD) is a novel 
technology that has great potential to advance satellite-QKD missions and quantum 
technologies involving single-photon detection and advanced photon counting 
applications. SNSPDs comprise solid-state and optic aspects enabling high-rate (1.3 
GBit s-1) quantum key distribution for long-range quantum communication (>1200 
km) as well as space communication (239,000 miles). SNSPDs perform excellently in 
four single-photon relevant characteristics for UV to mid-IR wavelength ranges: high 
detection efficiency, low false-signal rate, low uncertainty in photon time arrival and 
fast reset time, though they cannot be optimized simultaneously. They often 
outperform the best available semiconductor based single-photon detectors [95]. This 
makes them attractive for several applications in space technologies, nearly 
commercial quantum systems and quantum optics [96]. However, SNSPDs are 
currently limited by the availability of cooling technologies, and all past experimental 
demonstrations have had ground-based applications [97]. This limits their application 
to satellite-QKD missions using downlink configurations where photon detectors are 
located at one the ground stations. Further development in SNSPDs allowing them to 
operate in space can allow them to be incorporated in a greater variety of satellite-
QKD missions, specifically those involving uplink configurations.  
 
Future research can also look into the consolidation experimental evidence of 
different link types facilitating comparative analysis. There have been several 
missions investigating the feasibility of uplink transmission (see Section III. 
Advancement 8). Consolidation of experimental evidence of different link types will 
allow us to directly compare the accuracy of optical links with various configurations.  
 
The creation of constellations of QKD satellites can bring us closer to large-
scale or even global quantum networks that enable the sharing of symmetric 
encryption keys between any two points on Earth. A constellation model is described 
which enables QKD-derived encryption keys to be established between any two-
ground stations with low latency [98]. To provide global real-time quantum 
communication connectivity, a feasible solution is the building of a satellite 
constellation (SC), composed of multiple quantum satellites operating in LEO, and 
high-earth-orbits (HEO), including GEO satellites [99]. Investigations into regional 
and eventual global networks can be made, as well as considering the use of inter-
satellite QKD links for the transfer of keys between LEO trusted-note QKD satellites, 
GEO relay satellites and ground stations. 
 
Additionally, comparing DV-QKD and CV-QKD protocols is a potential area 
for further research. Historically, most missions, including those discussed in Section 
III, make use of discrete-variable schemes such as photon polarization, where 
information is encoded onto discrete degrees of freedom of optical signals. Further 
investigations can be made into CV-QKD, which involves encoding information in 
the quadratures of randomly selected coherent states (such as position or momentum). 
Comparisons of the performance of the two classes of protocols can be made using 
metrics such as relative secret key rates, transmission distances, communication 
overheads and computing resource requirements of error correction codes. 
 
 Finally, while daytime QKD has been experimentally proven to be feasible 
from space, further investigations into daytime QKD from the ground can be made. A 
significant challenge of implementing free-space QKD systems in daylight is the 
impact of scattered background noise photons from sunlight. This hence requires 
elaborate elimination in spectral, temporal, and spatial domains to decrease the QBER 
and guarantee the system’s security [100]. While space-based daylight QKD has been 
relatively successful, different combinations of filtering techniques can be 
investigated to increase the accuracy of ground-based daytime QKD. 
 
 In conclusion, significant progress has been made in satellite-QKD in recent 
years. While there are still a number of technological challenges to overcome through 
further research, many advances have been made thus far, bringing us closer to 
robust, accurate and quantum-safe encryption methods, and potentially a global 
quantum network in the near future.   
V. Bibliography 
 
[1] Information Assurance Directorate, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Commercial National Security 
Algorithm Suite and Quantum Computing FAQ”, Identifier: MFQ-U-OO-815099-15 (2016).   
[2] Campagna M, Chen L, Dagdelen Ö, Ding J, Fernick JK, Gisin N, Hayford D, Jennewein T, Lütkenhaus N, Mosca M, Neill B, 
Pecen M, Perlner R, Ribordy G, Schanck JM, Stebila D, Walenta N, Whyte W, Zhang Z. Quantum safe cryptography and 
security. vol. 8. 2015. p. 1-63.   
[3] Gisin, N., Ribordy, G., Tittel, W. and Zbinden, H., “Quantum cryptography”, Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).   
[4]	 Wootters WK, Zurek WH.. A single quantum cannot be cloned. Nature. 1982; 299:5886:802–3. 
http://doi.org/10.1038/299802a0  
[5] Takesue, H. et al. Quantum key distribution over a 40-dB channel loss using superconducting single-photon detectors. Nature 
Photonics 1, 343-348 (2007).   
[6] Stucki, D. et al. High rate, long-distance quantum key distribution over 250 km of ultra low loss fibres. New J. Phys. 11, 
075003 (2009).   
[7] Liu, Y. et al. Decoy-state quantum key distribution with polarized photons over 200 km. Opt. Express 18, 8587-8594 
[8] Aleksic S, Winkler D, Franzl G, Poppe A, Schrenk B, Hipp F. Quantum Key Distribution Over Optical Access Networks. 
Proc. 18th European Conference on Network and Optical Communications & 8th Conference on Optical Cabling and 
Infrastructure (NOC-OC&I),  
[9] Scarani, V. et al. The security of practical quantum key distribution. Reviews of Modern Physics 81, 1301-1350  (2009).   
[10] Erik Kerstel, Arnaud Gardelein , Mathieu Barthelemy. Matthias Fink, Siddarth Koduru Joshi, Rupert Ursin. (2017) 
Nanobob: A Cubesat Mission Concept For Quantum Communication Experiments In An Uplink Configuration 
[11] Briegel HJ, Dür W, Cirac JI, Zoller P (1998) Quantum repeaters: the role of imperfect local operations in quantum 
communication. Phys Rev Lett 81(26):5932 
[12] Hevner R, Holemans W, Pui-Suari J, Twiggs R (2011). An Advanced Standard for CubeSats.  In 25th Annual AIAA/USU 
Conference on Small Satellites (abstr. SSC11-II-3).   
[13] Villoresi, P. et al. Experimental verification of the feasibility of a quantum channel between space and Earth.  New J. Phys. 
10,033038 (2008) 
[14] Bonato, C., Tomaello, A., Da Deppo, V., Naletto, G. & Villoresi, P. Feasibility of satellite quantum key  distribution. New J. 
Phys. 11, 045017 (2009).   
[15] Nordholt, J.E., Hughes, R.J., Morgan, G.L., Peterson, C.G. & Wipf, C.C. Present and future free-space quantum  key 
distribution. Proc. SPIE 4635, 116 (2002).   
[16] Yin J, Ren JG, Lu H, Cao Y, Yong HL, Wu YP, Liu C, Liao SK, Zhou F, Jiang Y, Cai XD, Xu P, Pan GS, Jia JJ, Huang 
YM, Yin H, Wang JY, Chen YA, Peng CZ, Pan JW. Quantum teleportation and entanglement distribution over 100-kilometre 
free-space channels. Nature. 2012 Aug 9;488(7410):185-8. doi: 10.1038/nature11332. 
[17] Rideout, D. et al. Fundamental quantum optics experiments conceivable with  satellites—reaching relativistic distances and 
velocities. Class. Quantum Gravity  29, 224011 (2012).   
[18] NASA Earth Observatory. Catalog of Earth Satellite Orbits. https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/OrbitsCatalog (2009) 
[19] Sheng-Kai, L. et al. Ground test of satellite constellation based quantum communication ArXiV preprint 1611.09982v1 
(2016). 
[20] Kidder, S. Q. & Vonder Haar, T. H. On the use of satellites in molniya orbits for meteorological observation of middle and 
high latitudes. J. Atmos. Ocean. Technol. 7, 517–522 (1990). 
[21] Rideout, D. et al. Fundamental quantum optics experiments conceivable with satellites—reaching relativistic distances and 
velocities. Class. Quantum Gravity 29, 224011 (2012). 
[22] Nordholt, J. E., Hughes, R. J., Morgan, G. L., Peterson, C. G. & Wipf, C. C. Present and future free-space quantum key 
distribution. in High-Power Lasers and Applications, 116–126 (International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2002). 
[23] Rarity, J. G., Gorman, P. M., Knight, P., Weinfurter, H. & Kurtsiefer, C. Quantum communications in space. Optical 
Science and Technology, SPIE’s 48th Annual Meeting, 240–251 (International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2004). 
[24] Sheng-Kai, L. et al. Satellite-to-ground quantum key distribution ArXiV preprint 1707.00542v1 (2017).  
[25] Jennewein, T. et al. QEYSSAT: A mission proposal for a quantum receiver in space. Proc. SPIE 8997, 89970A (2014). 
[26] Makarov, V. et al. Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage. Phys. Rev. A 94, 030302 (2016).  
[27] Capraro, I. et al. Impact of turbulence in long range quantum and classical  communications. Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 1–5 
(2012).   
[28] Vallone, G. et al. Experimental satellite quantum communications. Phys. Rev. Lett. 115, 1–5 (2015).  
[29] Perdigues Armengol, J. M. et al. Quantum communications at ESA: Towards a space experiment on the ISS. Acta 
Astronaut. 63, 165–178 (2008).  
[30] Liao, S.-K. et al. Long-distance free-space quantum key distribution in daylight towards inter-satellite communication. Nat. 
Photon. 11, 509 E2 80 93513 (2017). 
[31] ARES Consortium. Inter-Satellite Links and ARES Capabilities. http://www.ares-consortium.org/It/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/13.10.16-ISL-ARES-Capabilities-.pdf (n.d.) 
[32] Diamanti, E. & Leverrier, A. Distributing secret keys with quantum continuous variables: principle, security and 
implementations. Entropy 17, 6072–6092 (2015). 
[33] Grosshans, F. et al. Quantum key distribution using gaussian-modulated coherent states. Nature 421, 238–241 (2003).  
[34] Jouguet, P., Kunz-Jacques, S., Leverrier, A., Grangier, P. & Diamanti, E. Experi- mental demonstration of long-distance 
continuous-variable quantum key dis- tribution. Nat. Photonics 7, 378–381 (2013).  
[35] Weier, H., Schmitt-Manderbach, T., Regner, N., Kurtsiefer, C. & Weinfurter, H. Free space quantum key distribution: 
towards a real life application. Fortschr. Phys. 54, 840–845 (2006).   
[36] Jofre, M. et al. Fast optical source for quantum key distribution based on semiconductor optical amplifiers. Opt. Express 19, 
3825 (2011).   
[37] A Yassien, Fuad, Tawfeeq, Shelan & I Khalil, Ahmed & R Aziz, Farah. (2010). Generation of Weak Coherent Pulses for 
Quantum Cryptography Systems. 1-8. 
[38] Couteau, Christopher. Spontaneous parametric down-conversion. Contemporary Physics. 1-14. 
10.1080/00107514.2018.1488463. {2018) 
[39] Erven, Chris. On Free Space Quantum Key Distribution and its Implementation with a Polarization-Entangled Parametric 
Down Conversion Source. (2019) 
[40]	 Bennett CH, Brassard G. Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing. Theoretical Computer Science, 
560:P1, 7 E2 80 9311. 2014. doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2014.05.025.  
[41] Bennett, C. H. Quantum cryptography: public key distribution and coin tossing. Int. Conf. Comput. Syst. Signal Process. 
IEEE 1984, 175–179 (1984).   
[42] Bennett, C. H. Quantum cryptography using any two nonorthogonal states. Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).  
[43] Scarani, V., Acin, A., Ribordy, G. & Gisin, N. Quantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting 
attacks for weak laser pulse imple- mentations. Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004).  
[44] Mavroeidis, Vasileios & Vishi, Kamer & Zych, Mateusz & Jøsang, Audun.. The Impact of Quantum Computing on Present 
Cryptography. International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications. 9.10.14569/IJACSA.2018.090354. Image 
URL https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Key-exchange-in-the-BB84-protocol-implemented-with-polarization-of-photons-
adapted-from_fig1_324115273 (2018) 
[45] Bennett, C. H., Brassard, G. & Mermin, N. D. Quantum cryptography without bell’s theorem. Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 557 
(1992). 
[46] Erven, Chris. On Free Space Quantum Key Distribution and its Implementation with a Polarization-Entangled Parametric 
Down Conversion Source. (2019) 
[47] Ekert, A. K. Quantum cryptography based on bell’s theorem. Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991). 
[48] Singh, H., Gupta, D.L., & Singh, A.K. Quantum Key Distribution Protocols: A Review. (2014) 
[49] Acín, A. et al. Device-independent security of quantum cryptography against collective attacks. Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 230501 
(2007).  
[50] Ling, A. et al. Experimental quantum key distribution based on a Bell test. Phys. Rev. A. 78, 020301 (2008).  
[51] Scheidl, T. et al. Feasibility of 300 km quantum key distribution with entangled  states. New. J. Phys. 11, 085002 (2009).   
[52] Vaonis. Reflector vs. Refractor Telescopes. https://vaonis.com/reflector-vs-refractor-telescopes (2018) 
[53] Howell, E. Keck Observatory: Twin Telescopes on Mauna Kea. (2018)  
[54] Carr, K. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Reflecting Telescopes. (2018) 
[55] Russell A. Chipman, Daniel M. Brown, and James P. McGuire, "Polarization aberration analysis of the advanced x-ray 
astrophysics facility telescope assembly," Appl. Opt. 31, 2301-2313 (1992) 
[56] The University of Arizona. Space versus Ground Telescopes. https://research.arizona.edu/learn-more/space-versus-ground-
telescopes (n.d.) 
[57] DFM Engineering Inc. Satellite Tracking Telescopes. 
http://www.dfmengineering.com/news/SatelliteTrackingTelescopes.pdf (n.d.) 
[58] Mafu, M., Petruccione, F. Derivation of the quantum bit-error-rate for BB84 protocol based on the phase-covariant cloning 
machine. (n.d.) 
[59] Peloso M. P., Gerhardt I., HoC., Lamas-Linares A. & Kurtsiefer C. Daylight operation  of a free space, entanglement-based 
quantum key distribution system. New J. Phys. 11, 13 (2009). 
[60] Er-Long, M. et al. Background noise of satellite-to-ground quantum key distribution. New. J. Phys. 7, 215 (2005).  
[61] Tomaello, A., Bonato, C., Da Deppo, V., Naletto, G. & Villoresi, P. Link budget and background noise for satellite quantum 
key distribution. Adv. Space Res. 47, 802–810 (2011).  
[62] Benton, D. M., Gorman, P. M., Tapster, P. R. & Taylor, D. M. A compact free space quantum key distribution system 
capable of daylight operation. Opt. Commun. 283, 2465–2471 (2010).  
[63] Günthner, K. et al. Quantum-limited measurements of optical signals from a geostationary satellite. Optica 4, 611 (2017).  
[64] Bourgoin, J.-P. et al. A comprehensive design and performance analysis of low Earth orbit satellite quantum 
communication. New. J. Phys. 15, 023006 (2013).  
[65] Couteau, Christopher. Spontaneous parametric down-conversion. Contemporary Physics. 1-14. 
10.1080/00107514.2018.1488463. {2018) 
[66] Matthias Bock, Andreas Lenhard, Christopher Chunnilall, and Christoph Becher, "Highly efficient heralded single-photon 
source for telecom wavelengths based on a PPLN waveguide," Opt. Express 24, 23992-24001 (2016) 
[67] Toyoshima, M. et al. Polarization measurements through space-to-ground atmospheric propagation paths by using a highly 
polarized laser source in space. Opt. Express 17, 22333–22340 (2009).   
[68] Yin, J. et al. Experimental quasi-single-photon transmission from satellite to earth. Opt. Express 21, 20032 (2013).   
[69] Vallone, G. et al. Experimental satellite quantum communications. Phys. Rev. Lett. 115, 1–5 (2015).  
[70] Haber, R., Garbe, D., Busch, S., Rosenfeld, W., & Schilling, K. (2018). Qube - A CubeSat for Quantum Key Distribution 
Experiments. 
[71] Pan, J.-w Quantum science satellite. Chin. J. Sp. Sci. 34, 547–549 (2014).   
[72] Kerstel, Erik & Gardelein, A & Barthelemy, Mathieu & CSUG Team, The & Fink, Matthias & Koduru Joshi, Siddarth & 
Ursin, Rupert. (2017). Nanobob: A Cubesat Mission Concept For Quantum Communication Experiments In An Uplink 
Configuration. EPJ Quantum Technology. 5. 10.1140/epjqt/s40507-018-0070-7. 
[73] Takenaka, H., Carrasco-Casado, A., Fujiwara, M., Kitamura, M., Sasaki, M. & Toyoshima, M. Satellite-to-ground quantum-
limited communication using a 50-kg-class microsatellite. Nat. Photon. (2017).  
[74] Tang, Z. et al. Generation and analysis of correlated pairs of photons aboard a  nanosatellite. Phys. Rev. Appl. 5, 054022 
(2016).   
[75] Günthner, K. et al. Quantum-limited measurements of optical signals from a geostationary satellite. Optica 4, 611 (2017) 
[76] Dequal, D. et al. Experimental single-photon exchange along a space link of 7000 km. Phys. Rev. A 93, 010301 (2016).   
[77] Nauerth, S. et al. Air-to-ground quantum communication. Nat. Photonics 7, 382–386 (2013).   
[78] Bourgoin, J.-P. et al. Free-space quantum key distribution to a moving receiver.  Opt. Express 23, 33437–33447 (2015).   
[79] Wang, J.-Y. et al. Direct and full-scale experimental verifications towards ground- satellite quantum key distribution. Nat. 
Photonics 7, 387–393 (2013).   
[80] Bedington, R. et al. Nanosatellite experiments to enable future space-based QKD missions. Quantum Technol. 3, 12 (2016). 
[81] Oi, D. K. et al. CubeSat quantum communications mission. EPJ Quantum Technol. 4, 6 (2017). 
[82] Liao S.K., Yong H.L., Liu C, Shentu G.L. Li D.D., Lin J., Dai H., Zhao S.Q., Li B., Guan J.Y., Chen W., Gong Y.H., Li Y., 
Lin Z.H., Pan G.S., Pelc J.S., Fejer M.M., Zhang W.Z., Liu W.Y., Yin J., Ren J.G., Wang X.B., Zhang Q., Peng C.Z., Pan J.W. 
Long-distance free-space quantum key distribution in daylight towards inter-satellite communication. Nature 
Photonics 11, pages 509–513 (2017) 
[83] Yun-Hong Gong, Kui-Xing Yang, Hai-Lin Yong, Jian-Yu Guan, Guo-Liang Shentu, Chang Liu, Feng-Zhi Li, Yuan Cao, 
Juan Yin, Sheng-Kai Liao, Ji-Gang Ren, Qiang Zhang, Cheng-Zhi Peng, and Jian-Wei Pan, "Free-space quantum key 
distribution in urban daylight with the SPGD algorithm control of a deformable mirror," Opt. Express 26, 18897-18905 (2018) 
[84] Peloso, Matthew & Gerhardt, Ilja & Ho, Caleb & Lamas-Linares, Antia & Kurtsiefer, Christian. Daylight operation of a free 
space, entanglement-based quantum key distribution system. New Journal of Physics. 11. 10.1088/1367-2630/11/4/045007. 
(2008) 
[85] Ko, Heasin & Kim, Kap-Joong & Choe, Joong-Seon & Choi, Byung-Seok & Kim, Jong-Hoi & Baek, Yongsoon & Youn, 
Chun Ju. Experimental filtering effect on the daylight operation of a free-space quantum key distribution. Scientific Reports. 8. 
10.1038/s41598-018-33699-y. (2018) 
[86] Jennewein, T. et al. QEYSSAT: A mission proposal for a quantum receiver in space. Proc. SPIE 8997, 89970A (2014). 
[87] Scheidl, T., Wille, E. & Ursin, R. Quantum optics experiments using the International Space Station: a proposal. New. J. 
Phys. 15, 043008 (2013). 
[88] Neumann, S.P., Joshi, S.K., Fink, M., Scheidl, T., Blach, R., Scharlemann, C.A., Abouagaga, S., Bambery, D., Kerstel, E., 
Barthélemy, M.J., & Ursin, R. Q3 Sat: quantum communications uplink to a 3U CubeSat—feasibility & design. (2018) 
[89] University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Illinois wins nasa awards for three cubesat missions. 
https://aerospace.illinois.edu/news/illinois-wins-nasa-awards-three-cubesat-missions (2016).  
[90] Perdigues Armengol, J. M. et al. Quantum communications at ESA: Towards a space experiment on the ISS. Acta 
Astronaut. 63, 165–178 (2008).  
[91] Zeitler, C., Graham, T. M., Chapman, J., Bernstein, H. & Kwiat, P. G. Super-dense  teleportation for space applications. 
Proc. SPIE 9739, 973912 (2016).   
[92] Eurostars. QuCHAP. https://www.eurostars-eureka.eu/project/id/9667 (2015) 
[93] Pultarova, T. Along with communications, quantum clocks and gravity sensors are emerging as early adopters of quantum 
technologies. https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2019/04/unleashing-quantum-into-the-world/ (2019) 
[94] SpaceTech Asia. UK and Singapore to collaborate on quantum CubeSat. http://www.spacetechasia.com/uk-and-singapore-
to-collaborate-on-quantum-cubesat/ (2018) 
[95] Chandra M Natarajan et al. Superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors: physics and applications. Supercond. Sci. 
Technol. 25 063001 (2012) 
[96] Holzman, I. and Ivry, Y. Superconducting Nanowires for Single‐Photon Detection: Progress, Challenges, and 
Opportunities. Adv. Quantum Technol., 2: 1800058. doi:10.1002/qute.201800058 (2019) 
[97] Lixing You, Jia Quan, Yong Wang, Yuexue Ma, Xiaoyan Yang, Yanjie Liu, Hao Li, Jianguo Li, Juan Wang, Jingtao Liang, 
Zhen Wang, and Xiaoming Xie, "Superconducting nanowire single photon detection system for space applications," Opt. 
Express 26, 2965-2971 (2018) 
[98] Vergoossen, Tom & Loarte, Sergio & Bedington, Robert & Kuiper, Hans & Ling, Alexander. (2019). Satellite constellations 
for trusted node QKD networks. 
[99] University of Science and Technology of China. A Step Towards Satellite Constellation-Based Quantum Communication. 
https://en.ustc.edu.cn/2018/0625/c5395a268248/pagem.htm (n.d.) 
[100] Ko, Heasin & Kim, Kap-Joong & Choe, Joong-Seon & Choi, Byung-Seok & Kim, Jong-Hoi & Baek, Yongsoon & Youn, 
Chun Ju. (2018). Experimental filtering effect on the daylight operation of a free-space quantum key distribution. Scientific 
Reports. 8. 10.1038/s41598-018-33699-y. 
[101] Bedington, R., Miguel Arrazola Mantilla, J. & Ling, A. (2017). Progress in satellite quantum key distribution. npj Quantum 
Information. 3. 10.1038/s41534-017-0031-5.  
[102] Singh H., Gupta, D.L., A.K Singh. (2014). Quantum Key Distribution Protocols: A Review. IOSR Journal of Computer 
Engineering (IOSR-JCE). eVolume 16, Issue 2, Ver. XI (Mar-Apr. 2014) 
[103] T. Jennewein, C. Grant, E. Choi, C. Pugh, C. Holloway, J. P. Bourgoin, H. Hakima, B. Higgins, and R. Zee. The 
NanoQEY Mission: Ground to Space Quantum Key and Entanglement Distribution Using a Nanosatellite. In Gruneisen, MT and 
Dusek, M and Rarity, JG and Lewis, KL and Hollins, RC and Merlet, TJ and Toet, A, editor, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES IN 
SECURITY AND DEFENCE II AND QUANTUM-PHYSICS-BASED INFORMATION SECURITY III, volume 9254 of 
Proceedings of SPIE. SPIE, 2014. Conference on Emerging Technologies in Security and Defence II and Quantum- Physics-
based Information Security III, Amsterdam, NETHERLANDS, SEP 22-23, 2014. 
[104] C. J. Pugh, P. Kolenderski, C. Scarcella, A. Tosi, and T. Jennewein. Towards correcting atmospheric beam wander via 
pump beam control in a down conversion process. OPTICS EXPRESS, 24(18):20947– 20955, SEP 5 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
